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EXPLORING THE CASE FOR HEALTHCARE AS AN
UNENUMERATED, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
Andre “Truth” McDavid and Brandon A. Robinson1
Introduction
The following is the second of a two-part discussion of health-
care as a putative fundamental right under the U.S. Constitution.  In
last spring’s issue of the North Carolina Central University Biotech-
nology and Pharmaceutical Law Review, the authors published the
brief article, “Should Healthcare Be a Fundamental Right?,” in which
we posited that a constitutional floor of access to basic, stabilizing
care was a desideratum, without which “life, liberty and the pursuit of
happiness” could scarcely be maintained in modern society.2  Analyz-
ing fundamental rights from the premise that American history can be
understood as a gradual expansion of freedom and inclusion, we
noted that many fundamental rights today—such as interstate travel,
the right to vote, privacy, and reproductive autonomy—were recog-
nized as such only after the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that deny-
ing certain classes these rights was effectively denying them citizen-
ship.3  Another way of putting it is that fundamental rights—whether
“self evident” at our nation’s founding, or only after decades or cen-
turies of time—essentially center on equal access to the American
mainstream.4  Since the mid 20th century, any alleged governmental
1. ANDRE “TRUTH” MCDAVID is Associate Attorney at Swaim Law, PLLC, in
the greater Raleigh, North Carolina area.  He earned a J.D. from North Carolina
Central University School of Law in 2012, and a B.A. in Philosophy of Law at
North Carolina State University in 2008.  His professional areas of interest are
constitutional law, civil litigation and criminal defense. BRANDON A. ROBINSON is
Public Communications Specialist and Legal Analyst at University of North
Carolina General Administration in Chapel Hill, North Carolina.  He earned a J.D.
from North Carolina Central University School of Law in 2013, a M.A. in
American history from Western Carolina University in 2010, and a B.A. in
European history and philosophy from the same institution in 2005.  His
professional areas of interest are constitutional law, property and higher education
law, American political history, and European intellectual history.  The authors
would like to thank the Editorial Board and staff editors of the North Carolina
Central University Biotechnology and Pharmaceutical Law Review for an
enriching, mutually edifying collaboration.
2. Andre McDavid and Brandon A. Robinson, Should Healthcare Be a
Fundamental Right?, 6 N.C. CENT. BIOTECH & PHARM. L. REV. 79 (2013).
3. Id. at 79-80.
4. Id. at 87.
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intrusion on such democratic access has triggered strict scrutiny anal-
ysis by the federal courts, either because the right is fundamental, or
because the petitioner represents a suspect class.5
While our purpose in this second article is harmonious with that
of the first, the task in effectuating that purpose is different in the
instant case.  Here, we explore the case to be made for basic health-
care as an unenumerated, fundamental right, using the same interpre-
tive resources and tools the Court has used before in analyzing the
constellation of rights in our legal and constitutional systems.  In con-
tending previously that basic healthcare should be a fundamental
right, we examined the fault lines of American history, studying how
politically seismic events like the Progressive Movement, the Great
Depression and New Deal, and the Civil Rights Movement trans-
formed American history and jurisprudence.  As we previously noted,
“‘Life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness’ has always been the ideal
standard for Americans, but historical facts on the ground have peri-
odically bent our thinking on what is essential to realize these desid-
erata.”6  This is how the Supreme Court could conclude in Brown v.
Board of Education (1954) that, based on public education’s central-
ity to American social and civic life by the mid 20th century, segre-
gated schools were inherently unconstitutional, even if they were
truly separate and equal.7  If Edmund Burke’s endorsement of history
as posterity’s guide8 retains any currency, it is proper to say that
American history has taught us that fundamental rights are not always
immediately apparent, but often become so only with time.9  This is
5. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). See also, e.g.,
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 267 (1986); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466
U.S. 429 (1984).  (Beginning with Korematsu, these cases and other articulate the
doctrine of strict scrutiny, and illustrate its application.).
6. Andre McDavid and Brandon A. Robinson, supra note 2, at 80.
7. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 492-493, 495 (1954).
8. EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 247, 250
(Conor Cruise O’Brien ed., Penguin Books 1986) (1790).  “In history a great
volume is unrolled for our instruction, drawing the materials of future wisdom from
the past errors and infirmities of mankind. . .History consists, for the greater part, of
the miseries brought upon the world by pride, ambition, avarice, revenge, lust,
sedition, hypocrisy, ungoverned zeal, and all the train of disorderly
appetites. . .history, in the nineteenth century, better understood, and better
employed, will, I trust, teach a civilized posterity to abhor the misdeeds of both
these barbarous ages.” See also generally JESSE NORMAN, EDMUND BURKE: THE
FIRST CONSERVATIVE (2013).
9. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION 128, 131 (2008).
Professor Tribe writes: “. . .liberty is more than a series of isolated points. . .”
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not a radical view, for no matter what social transformations have
defined American history at any critical point, our anchor has consist-
ently been the ideals of the Declaration of Independence and the Con-
stitution.  The American Founders who drafted these documents (and
risked everything for their ideals) did not aim for equality, but rather
equal opportunity among all citizens to thrive in the nation’s political,
economic, cultural and intellectual mainstream.10  Since the concept
of “citizen” has considerably evolved since the late 18th century, it
follows that the political, legal and civic rights necessary to sustain
citizenship have evolved, even as the Founders’ essential ideals have
remained constant.
Following this logic, we previously contended that the 21st cen-
tury, marked by unprecedented life expectancies, technological ad-
vances in healthcare, household bankruptcies due to medical costs,
and the culmination of over seventy years of active government in-
volvement in the healthcare marketplace, have revealed to us how
integral healthcare is to viable, meaningful citizenship in the United
States.11  In effect, healthcare has evolved from a rarefied luxury to a
putative fundamental right in a modern age—a desideratum for an
American citizen’s political, economic and civic existence.12
From the outset, proponents of a fundamental right to healthcare
must confront the reality that no express constitutional provision ex-
ists to that effect.  Also significant is that, while European nations
and intergovernmental entities have embraced healthcare as a funda-
mental human right, the American political definition of “human
rights” is much narrower, implicating only political and civil rights.13
Addressing these challenges, we analyze healthcare in the context of
the Ninth Amendment and the Bill of Rights, and explore a nexus
between healthcare and a citizen’s vital political, economic, and civic
interests.  These are parallel discussions that demonstrate healthcare’s
necessity as a means of effectuating the Founders’ aims in the Decla-
ration of Independence and the Constitution.
10. GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 5-8,
104-109 (1991); JOSEPH J. ELLIS, AMERICAN CREATION 15-16 (2007); T. H. BREEN,
THE MARKETPLACE OF REVOLUTION: HOW CONSUMER POLITICS SHAPED AMERICAN
INDEPENDENCE xv-xviii, 76-82 (2004).
11. See Andre McDavid and Brandon A. Robinson, supra note 2, at 79, 88-
90.
12. Id. at 79, 91-92.
13. Anita B. Pereira, Note, Live and Let Live: Healthcare is a Fundamental
Human Right, 3 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 414, 419-420 (2004).
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The Ninth Amendment, providing that “[t]he enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or dis-
parage others retained by the people,” is the fountain of unenumer-
ated rights jurisprudence.14  A dormant provision for most of Ameri-
can history, the Ninth Amendment is not a “source” of rights in itself,
but a textual justification for the judiciary to protect liberties that do
not appear, but are strongly implied, in the Constitution’s text.15  It
attracted renewed interest and scrutiny after Griswold v. Connecticut
(1965), in which the Court struck down a statute prohibiting contra-
ceptives on the ground that an implied right to privacy existed under
the Bill of Rights.16  Similarly, the Court has engaged in unenumer-
ated rights analyses to protect, inter alia, the right to marry, the right
to procreate, the right to rear one’s children, and, within certain
bounds, the right of a woman to terminate a pregnancy.17
Ninth Amendment proponents in 1791 understood that the Bill
of Rights would not and could not anticipate every potential en-
croachment on fundamental liberties.18  For context, they had no
choice but to consult the history of rights in the English constitutional
tradition, and their own experience under the British Crown prior to
the American Revolution.19  Whereas some rights, such as the right
against self-incrimination, or the right to a jury of one’s peers—had
been recognized in England since at least the Magna Carta (1215),
other fundamental liberties reflected fears that the new federal gov-
ernment would repeat injustices only recently experienced in the
1760s and 1770s.20  This explains why many of the grievances
14. U.S. CONST. amend. IX; ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
945 (3rd ed. 2009).
15. Id.
16. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
17. See generally Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Zablocki v. Redhail,
434 U.S. 378 (1978); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
18. GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY
REPUBLIC, 1789-1815 70-72 (2009).
19. Id. at 65-66; See also generally, EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE
PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA (1988).
20. See generally DANNY DANZIGER AND JOHN GILLINGHAM, 1215: THE
YEAR OF THE MAGNA CARTA (2003); JOHN FERLING, A LEAP IN THE DARK: THE
STRUGGLE TO CREATE THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 53-58, 70-79 (2003); ROGER
WILKINS, JEFFERSON’S PILLOW: THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE DILEMMA OF
BLACK PATRIOTISM 64-66 (2001).
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Thomas Jefferson listed in the Declaration of Independence (1776)
appear again in the Bill of Rights (1791): thus, both state papers em-
phasize access to judicial process, freedom of movement and associa-
tion, freedom of conscience, freedom from torture and freedom over
private property, because these were the liberties that the king had
often threatened, either in English history or in the Founders’ own
time as colonists.21  As a general rule, if the British monarchy did not
threaten a right at the time, it was not expressly mentioned in the
Constitution.22  Our forward-looking founders, therefore, included the
Ninth Amendment as a means to address future, unforeseen abuses
by the new government, especially if they arbitrarily abridged life,
liberty, or property interests.23
Based on these considerations, we invite a 21st-century Supreme
Court to recognize healthcare as a 21st-century fundamental right,
relying on unenumerated rights precedent since Griswold v. Connect-
icut.  In tendering that invitation, we draw upon law professor Erwin
Chemerinsky’s four-part framework for analyzing fundamental
rights: (1) Does a fundamental right exist?; (2) Is the fundamental
right infringed?; (3) Is the infringement upon the fundamental right
justified?; and (4) Is the government’s means sufficiently related to
the ends?24  We shall examine each question in turn.
Does a Fundamental Right Exist?
Determining whether a fundamental right exists in the first place
is the most difficult of the four questions, especially because there is
no bright-line test that the Supreme Court follows in answering it.25
In making that determination, the Court has utilized various theories
of constitutional interpretation, which we briefly list and explain.
Originalism, perhaps the most recognizable theory, expounds the
view that only those liberties expressly mentioned in the Constitu-
tion’s text are “fundamental.”26 Moderate originalism is similar to
originalism, but promotes consideration of the Framers’ general in-
21. See generally THE BILL OF RIGHTS; THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 24-27 (Adrienne Koch and William Peden, eds., 1993).
22. See WOOD, supra note 18, at 65-66.
23. Id. at 70; GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC,
1776-1787 542-43 (1969).
24. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 14, at 946-949.
25. Id. at 946.
26. Id. at 946-947.
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tent behind the Constitution, rather than exclusively those views ex-
pressly reflected in the text.27  Then there are those who say that fun-
damental rights can be gleaned from what is “deeply rooted in this
Nation’s history and tradition”—a term of art in unenumerated rights
jurisprudence, as we shall soon see.28  To a lesser degree of influence,
some scholars have argued that natural law principles should inform
our view of fundamental rights, or that the Court’s interpretation of
such rights should reflect the moral consensus of society, expressed
through the democratic process.29  Finally, there is the view that the
Court should ensure the Constitution’s harmonizing role in our politi-
cal society.30  Other modes of interpretation exist, but what all these
theories have in common is that they raise questions about the role an
unelected judiciary should play in determining fundamental rights in
a constitutional republic.31
We believe that basic healthcare is “deeply rooted in this Na-
tion’s history and tradition,” and harmonizes with moderate original-
ist views.  We find moderate originalism to be a clarifying mediator
between the “pure” originalism most often associated with Justice
Antonin Scalia, and the “living, breathing Constitution” view of Jus-
tice Stephen Breyer.32  In applying this theory, we avail ourselves not
only of the Bill of Rights’ express provisions, but also the Preamble
to the Constitution, the Declaration of Independence, and implicit
goals that often and consistently appear throughout the Constitution.
An optimal starting place for the Framers’ general intent can be
found in the Preamble, for it was explicitly conceived as the readers’
introduction to the Articles and Amendments that follow, and de-
scribes the general aims for which the Constitution was created in the
first place.  The Preamble expresses only five goals: “justice,” “do-
mestic Tranquility,” “common defence [sic],” “general welfare,” and
27. Id. at 947.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. For perspective on how these competing views characterize the current
Supreme Court, see generally JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT:
THE INSIDE STORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT (2007); JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD
OF THE SUPREME COURT (2007); JEFFREY ROSEN, THE SUPREME COURT: THE
PERSONALITIES AND RIVALRIES THAT DEFINED AMERICA (2007).
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“Blessings of Liberty.”33  All five goals serve the super arching pur-
pose of forming “a more perfect Union,”34 and it is highly significant
that “general welfare” and liberty made the shortlist; the Framer’s
general treatment of these as equal to justice and national defense
signals their belief that a citizen’s basic well being was just as impor-
tant to them as national security, and that protecting such general well
being was essential to a “more perfect Union” under the Constitution.
Such an elevated view of a citizen’s well being is entirely con-
sistent with the spirit of the Bill of Rights.  Channeling John Locke’s
emphasis on “life, liberty and Estate,” from the Second Treatise on
Government (1689),35 the Framers treated these three ideas as equally
significant to a citizen’s civic existence, and drafted the Bill of Rights
in such a way as to treat them as symbiotic and interconnected.36  The
First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments each protect citi-
zens’ bodily dignity in some way, whether by protecting their free-
dom of movement or association; their security in their own persons
and effects; their physical space at home; their rights once they are
haled into court on criminal charges; or their bodies from torture.37
The Bill of Rights makes clear that sovereign power must not inter-
fere with a citizen’s body or things closely associated with that body
(e.g., personal effects, the home) but for exceptional circumstances,
and that “life, liberty and property” cannot be divested without “due
process of law.”38
The Eighth Amendment links the Bill of Rights’ protections of
bodily dignity to healthcare concerns.  The Court has interpreted that
Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishments” to
mean that incarcerated Americans must receive basic, stabilizing
healthcare.39  Even before incorporating healthcare into its Eighth
Amendment analysis in 1976, the Court had long viewed the Amend-
ment as both a testament to the Founders’ enlightened views on the
dignity of human life, and the juxtaposition of capital punishment
33. U.S. CONST. Preamble.  (In this and all other references to 17th and 18th
century documents, we retain the punctuation of the pertinent era.)
34. Id.
35. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 323-324 (Peter Laslett
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1689).
36. See generally, RICHARD LABUNSKI, JAMES MADISON AND THE STRUGGLE
FOR THE BILL OF RIGHTS (2006).
37. U.S. CONST. amends. I, III, IV, V, VIII.
38. Id.
39. See generally Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
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within “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of
maturing society.”40  Federal and state prisons cannot take this
lightly, for as Justice Powell has warned:
[A] policy of judicial restraint cannot encompass any failure to
take cognizance of valid constitutional claims whether arising in a
federal or state institution.  When a prison regulation or practice
offends a fundamental constitutional guarantee, federal courts
will discharge their duty to protect constitutional rights.41
In Estelle v. Gamble (1976), the Court carried almost a century of
Eight Amendment jurisprudence to its logical conclusion, setting a
constitutional floor of healthcare for incarcerated Americans:
. . .deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners
constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’ Gregg
v. Georgia, supra, at 173 (joint opinion), proscribed by the Eighth
Amendment.  This is true whether the indifference is manifested
by prison doctors in their response to the prison’s needs or by
prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying access to medi-
cal care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once
prescribed.42
These cases should be read together as the Court’s unambiguous en-
forcement of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of inhumane treat-
ment of prisoners; however, they also reveal the Founders’ general
desire to ensure a basic threshold of life and dignity under the Consti-
tution.  No one put this better than Chief Justice Earl Warren: “the
basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than
the dignity of man.”43
If a basic, constitutional threshold of life and dignity exists for
incarcerated Americans, it syllogistically follows that one exists also
for free citizens.  However, whereas the former’s loss of liberty
makes plain the need for explicit protections, the latter’s possession
of liberty makes such protections more subtle.  These are further re-
vealed by examining whether healthcare is “deeply rooted in the Na-
tion’s history and tradition.”44  This concept grows from Justice Ar-
thur Goldberg’s concurring opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut,
which stresses that a right is fundamental, if it “‘is of such a character
that it cannot be denied without violating those ‘fundamental princi-
ples of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and
40. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
41. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405-406 (1974).
42. See Estelle v. Gamble, supra note 39, at 104-105.
43. See Trop v. Dulles, supra note 40, at 100.
44. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 14, at 947.
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political institutions’. . .”45  Justice Goldberg noted that jurists should
not look to their “personal and private notions,” but rather the “‘tradi-
tions and [collective] conscience of our people.’”46
In the Founders’ writings, America’s state papers, the Founders’
reference materials, and the American imagination, “life” and “lib-
erty” are closely conjoined, if not inseparable.  In the Declaration of
Independence, Thomas Jefferson paraphrased John Locke’s “life, lib-
erty and Estate,”47 to include “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happi-
ness.”48 Listing the colonists’ grievances, he accused King George III
of “wag[ing] cruel war against human nature itself, violating its most
gained rights of life and liberty. . .”49  He famously ended America’s
birth certificate with the Founders’ pledge of their “lives, [their] for-
tunes, and [their] sacred honor.”50  Moreover, just two years before
the Declaration, Jefferson won continental fame for declaring in his
“Summary View of the Rights of British America” (1774) that “[t]he
God who gave us life, gave us liberty at the same time: the hand of
force may destroy but cannot disjoin them” (emphasis added).51  Fur-
thermore, Jefferson’s fellow lawyer and Virginian, the orator Patrick
Henry, stirred revolutionary ire with his “Give Me Liberty, or Give
Me Death!” address, and other anti-colonial orations.52
The Founding Generation did not articulate their life and liberty
ideas in a vacuum, but drew from over a thousand years of English,
Greek and Roman, and modern continental history.53  Plato, Thucydi-
des, Aristotle, Cicero, Livy and Tacitus shaped the Founders’ ideas
on various forms of government;54 and since the Founders as late as
45. See Griswold v. Connecticut, supra note 16, at 493 (quoting Snyder v.
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
46. Id. (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
47. See JOHN LOCKE, supra note 35, at 323-324.
48. See THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra
note 21 at 24.
49. Id. at 26.
50. Id. at 28-29.
51. Id. at 289.
52. CARL BRIDENBAUGH, SEAT OF EMPIRE: THE POLITICAL ROLE OF
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY WILLIAMSBURG 55-57, 59-62 (1958). Also see generally,
RHYS ISAAC, THE TRANSFORMATION OF VIRGINIA, 1740-1790 (1982).
53. See generally BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967).
54. See generally FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE
INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION (1985); see also FORREST
MCDONALD, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY (1994).
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the 1770s saw themselves as Englishmen,55 they also drew heavily on
John Locke and other 17th and 18th-century English political theo-
rists, such as Sir James Harrington, John Trenchard, Algernon Sid-
ney, and Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke.56  Steeped in a com-
mon law tradition of privileges and liberties going back to King
Henry II,57 the Founders saw King George III’s encroachments on
liberty, and Parliament’s “taxation without representation,” as parts
of “a deliberate, systematical plan of reducing us to slavery.”58  With-
out a guarantee that loyalty to the Crown would preserve a basic
threshold of both life and liberty, the Founders believed that they
would one day suffer the indignity of being less than human, similar
perhaps to the slaves that many of them owned.59  The great irony of
the American Revolution is that its leaders are often viewed today as
radicals, although many of them considered themselves classical con-
servatives; they created a new government, but did so in order to
preserve a life-and-liberty symbiosis that they saw as “deeply rooted”
55. See e.g., THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON,
supra note 21, at 273-274: “To remind [the king] that our ancestors, before their
emigration to America, were the free inhabitants of the British dominions in
Europe, and possessed a right, which nature has given to all men, of departing from
the country in which chance, not choice, has placed them, of going in quest of new
habitations, and of there establishing new societies, under such laws and
regulations as, to them, shall seem most likely to promote public happiness.  That
their Saxon ancestors had, under this universal law, in like manner, left their native
wilds and woods in the North of Europe, had possessed themselves of the Island of
Britain, then less charged with inhabitants, and had established there that system of
laws which has so long been the glory and protection of that country.”
56. See BAILYN, supra note 53, at 34-36, 39, 51-53; JOSEPH J. ELLIS,
PASSIONATE SAFE: THE CHARACTER AND LEGACY OF JOHN ADAMS 89-90 (1993);
see also generally, JAMES HARRINGTON, THE COMMONWEALTH OF OCEANA and A
SYSTEM OF POLITICS (J.G.A. Pocock, ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1992) (1656).
57. John Gillingham, The Early Middle Ages, 1066-1290, in THE OXFORD
HISTORY OF BRITAIN 173-176 (Kenneth O. Morgan, ed., 1999).
58. See THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra
note 21, at 278.
59. EDMUND S. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY, AMERICAN FREEDOM: THE
ORDEAL OF COLONIA VIRGINIA 4 (1975). (“The men who came together to found
the independent United States, dedicated to freedom and equality, either held slaves
or were willing to join hands with those who did.  None of them felt entirely
comfortable about the fact, but neither did they feel responsible for it.  Most of
them had inherited both their slaves and their attachment to freedom from an earlier
generation, and they knew that the two were not unconnected.  The rise of liberty
and the equality in America had been accompanied by the rise of slavery.”)
(emphasis added).
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in the traditions they inherited.60  In adopting English common law
and codifying many of its precedents into constitutions and statutes,
our first American generation bequeathed this life-and-liberty tradi-
tion to all succeeding generations, down to this day.
Is the Fundamental Right Infringed?
As we have seen, the great thrust of Anglo-American legal and
political precedent tends strongly towards basic healthcare as a fun-
damental right.  If it were recognized as such, how would we know if
that fundamental right was infringed?  Except for involuntary servi-
tude, all Constitutional analysis centers on state action.61  Therefore,
a respondent-institution in a fundamental rights case would likely be
a federal or state-operated healthcare facility; a research hospital that
receives federal or state grants; and, more likely than not, a health-
care facility, public or private, that receives Medicare, Medicaid, or
other social safety-net-related reimbursements.  In sum, the depriving
institution in such a case must either be a state actor itself, or an
entity whose actions fall under the two main exceptions to the state
action doctrine: (1) entanglement with a local, state, or federal gov-
ernment;62 and/or (2) public function, by which a private entity per-
forms a traditionally governmental responsibility.63
As to what would constitute an undue governmental interference
with a fundamental right to healthcare, we limit ourselves to consid-
ering basic, stabilizing care in life-threatening or exigent situations
that could substantially impair a citizen’s daily conduct of life.  Al-
though many possible scenarios exist, the most likely one would in-
volve a hospital’s refusal to stabilize a patient because of inability to
pay.  Most hospitals in America are prohibited from discriminating
on such a basis under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active
Labor Act (EMTALA), an unfunded mandate to hospitals enacted in
60. See WOOD, supra note 10, at 3-6.
61. The Civil Rights Cases: United States v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3, 11, 20-21
(1883).
62. See generally Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715
(1961); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
63. See generally Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).  (Please note that the Court’s
interpretation of Marsh v. Alabama has been subsequently narrowed by Lloyd v.
Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 570 (1972), to privately owned towns, as opposed to the
privately-owned shopping center that was at issue in Lloyd v. Tanner.).
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1986, and currently the only impediment to hospitals denying critical
care to indigent patients.64  This protection, so taken for granted by
most Americans that it is often mistaken as fundamental, is purely
statutory; Congress enacted it, but could repeal it at any time, for any
reason.  The Constitution does not suggest, and we do not here con-
tend, that citizens are entitled to optimal care in all situations; how-
ever, the basic life-sustaining, life-supporting needs of patients is
closely enough connected to citizens’ economic, political and civic
existence that they should not hang on merely the legislative whim,
or fleeting political pressures of any era.
Is the Infringement Upon the Fundamental
Right Justified?
Should a state actor encroach upon a fundamental right to
healthcare, the government would have to prove a compelling justifi-
cation for that infringement.65  This is a nebulous concept, for the
Court has never precisely indicated what justifications are “compel-
ling.”66  However, we know that this standard is a high one for the
government to meet, and that the Court does not find compelling jus-
tifications lightly.67  Two rare exceptions are Korematsu v. United
States (1944),68 in which the Court found winning a war to be a com-
pelling governmental interest, and Zablocki v. Redhail (1978),69 in
which the Court similarly found the protection of children’s well be-
ing to be compelling.  In a healthcare-as-fundamental-right analysis,
we cannot state for certain what would be a compelling enough justi-
fication for denying citizens stabilizing care, but we do know that the
reason would have to outweigh the deprivation of services that would
preserve or greatly improve a patient’s essential life functions.
64. 42 U.S.C. 1395; William M. McDonnell, Will EMTALA Changes Leave
Emergency Patients Dying on the Doorstep? 38 J. HEALTH L. 77, 78 (Winter,
2005).
65. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 14, at 948.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. 323 U.S. 214. See also note 5.
69. 434 U.S. 374. See also note 17.
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Is the Government’s Means Sufficiently Related
to Its Ends?
Even assuming that the government successfully proved a com-
pelling interest in a healthcare-fundamental rights case, it must also
prove that the means it chose were necessary to effectuate the com-
pelling government interest: this signifies that the means the govern-
ment chose admitted no other alternative less intrusive of the funda-
mental right.70  In a healthcare context, the Court would therefore
inquire into whether a state actor could have achieved its critical pur-
pose without going to the ultimate step of denying a patient stabiliz-
ing care, possibly in a life-or-death situation, or exigent circumstance.
If the Court finds an alternative means that would both achieve the
same compelling ends, and burden the fundamental right less intru-
sively, the government is most unlikely to prevail.71
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we believe that a tenable case can be
made for basic healthcare as an unenumerated, fundamental right
under the Constitution.  In a nation expressly consecrated to “life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,” the denial of basic, life-sus-
taining care seems to offend the principles of the Bill of Rights, as
well as the Founders’ general aims in creating and ratifying the Con-
stitution.  Despite being among the freest peoples in the world during
the late 18th century, American colonists waged revolution against a
mighty king, in part because they feared that that king’s edicts
threatened a basic threshold of life and liberty—the very lifeblood of
freedom in Western civilization as they understood it.  They could
not have foreseen the close nexus between healthcare and the govern-
ment they founded, but the life-liberty symbiosis that healthcare im-
plicates would be quite familiar to them.  A basic threshold of access
to life-sustaining care makes everything else that citizens do—attain-
ing an education, earning a livelihood, raising a family, and building
a career—viable and possible.
70. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 14, at 949.  To see how the Court has applied
the “necessary to achieve a compelling interest” test, see Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 499 (1989); also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326-327
(2003).
71. Id.
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It is possible that the 21st century will witness a national health-
care dialogue that raises questions similar to those we raised in our
two-part discussion.  This will depend largely on whether the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (2010) succeeds in its aim of
insuring the greatest possible number of Americans, and also whether
poverty becomes the primary civil rights issue in our century.  In pre-
vious epocha, education, economic development and the ballot box
filtered those who achieved the American Dream from those who did
not; in our own time, the ability to take care of one’s self, or to avoid
a preventable, unnecessary death might become equally definitive as
a barrier to meaningful citizenship.  Reaching the ceiling of one’s
own American Dream has always been up to the individual, and this
will remain so.  However, thanks to a dynamic interpretation of the
Constitution, that document has guaranteed to millions of Americans
who were not “citizens” in 1789, a floor of protections in expression,
religion, civil and criminal procedure, due process of law, and equal
protection of the laws.  As to healthcare, we too ask for a floor—
nothing more, and nothing less.
